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Throughout history religious organizations often wielded political power. Ex-
isting, often informal, theories of the political and institutional e¤ects of organized
religion begin from the premise that religious leaders controlled popular support.
Adam Smith (2009 [1776], p. 284) remarked that [w]hen the authorized teachers
of religion propagate [...] doctrines subversive of the authority of the sovereign, it is
by violence only [...] that he can maintain his authority.Marx (1982 [1844], p. 42)
echoed Smiths insights, implying that in equilibrium religious elites are coopted by
the sovereign and discourage institutional change by preaching obedience.1
Recent research suggests that political freedom is correlated with a countrys pri-
mary religious a¢ liation both historically and today (Lipset 1959, 1994; Barro 1999).
The causal channels through which religion a¤ects political outcomes, however, re-
main poorly understood.
This paper uses over 700 years of Nile ood data to investigate the extent to which
religious leaders derived political inuence (dened as monetary transfers from the
military) from their control over popular support. In nding evidence consistent
with such popularly-derived inuence, it provides the rst empirical evidence sup-
porting the key premise of theories stressing the importance of religion in generating
institutional outcomes.
To investigate this question, I gather the dismissal dates of medieval Egypts
highest ranking religious authority. Historians believe that this authority known
as the head judgecontrolled popular support and used this control to extract con-
cessions from the military elites who appointed him. Historical evidence suggests
that during deviant Nile oods the head judges control over popular support and
his political inuencetemporarily increased. Empirical results are consistent with
this narrative and show that deviant Nile oods reduced the probability of judge
dismissal by roughly one-half.
This empirical result does not conclusively demonstrate that deviant Nile oods
increased the political inuence of the head judge by increasing his control over
popular support. One alternative explanation is that the head judge was an irrelevant
1See also Montesquieu (1989 [1748], p. 61) and De Toqueville (1983 [1856] p. 152; 2003 [1840],
pp. 111, 347).
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bureaucrat and during periods of Nile-induced famine military authorities were less
likely to dismiss any member of the bureaucracy. Another possible explanation is
that deviant Nile oods made the sultan more superstitious and thus less willing to
dismiss the religious authority.
I employ historical variation in popular adherence to the head judges denom-
ination (law school) to better understand the observed relationship between Nile
ood levels and head judge dismissal. Results show that the negative relationship
between deviant Nile oods and judge dismissal is stronger for judges that controlled
more popular support. These ndings cast doubt on alternative explanations and
stress the importance of increases in popular support in generating the negative
relationship between judge dismissal and deviant Nile oods.
The ndings in this paper suggest the historical importance of religion (culture)
in mobilizing popular support and determining coordinating equilibria (Greif 1994,
2006; Tabellini 2008, 2010). In this sense, the paper adds to a broader literature
emphasizing the economic and political importance of religion and culture (Barro
and McCleary 2003, 2005, 2006; Guiso et al. 2003, 2006; Iyigun 2008).
The results also provide the rst empirical support for a literature stressing the
political importance of religious leaders in the Islamic world.2 This literature comple-
ments the discussion in North et al. (2009, p. 45) that suggests that religious elites
historically used their popular inuence to help maintain rent-extracting institutional
equilibria.
Although the empirical results presented in this paper do not conclusively prove
that religious elites stied democratic change in medieval Egypt, they do show that
religion matteredwhen such change would have been less costly due to economic
shocks (Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a, 2001, 2006), Brückner and Ciccone (forth-
coming)). This result suggests that better understanding the political role of reli-
gious leaders (perhaps as rent-extracting elites as in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b,
2008)) may shed light on institutional outcomes in many areas of the world.
2Among a large literature see Lewis (1953), Gibb (1955a), Lapidus (1975), al-Sayyid-Marsot
(1973) and Burke (1987). For negative correlations between democracy and the percentage of the
population that is Muslim today see Barro (1999) and Fish (2002).
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The rst section briey reviews
the literature on the interplay between religion and politics and examines the political
role of religion in pre-modern Islamic Egypt. The second section uses historical
evidence to develop a simple conceptual framework relating deviant Nile oods to
increased head judge inuence. The third section describes the data. The fourth
section documents the e¤ect of Nile-induced famines on the probability of head judge
dismissal. The fth section investigates the plausibility of alternative explanations
for the results. The sixth section concludes.
1 Religion, Politics and Islamic Egypt
Barro (1999) notes that despite evidence that religious a¢ liation is an important
determinant of democracy the theory of the interplay between religion and political
structure is even less developed than other aspects of the theory of democracy.
Baruch de Spinoza (1632-1677) an inuential enlightenment thinkerwas an early
proponent of one of the few existing frameworks that explores the political e¤ects
of organized religion. He has been paraphrased as arguing that organized religion
is nothing other than a political and social device instituted to serve the well-being
of men [...Men use it] to astonish, terrify and elate the people and by this means
manipulate them [...T]he inevitable result [of this] is oppression and despotism
(Israel 2001, pp. 701, 708-709).
Recent scholarship suggests that religious leaders can use their control over pop-
ular support to political ends. Barro and McCleary (2005) note that the government
might want to use religion as a cooperative force for controlling the citizenry.Gill
(1998) argues that the state can use the popular inuence of religious leaders to help
them minimize the cost of ruling. Murphy and Shleifer (2004) view religious leaders
as brokers creating the networks [...] that bind members together [...and then] rent
outtheir networks.
In the Islamic world, scholars have long viewed religious elites as a check on the
absolute power of the sovereign. Al-Sayyid Marsot (1973, pp. 133-134) provides a
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clear exposition of this hypothesized function. She notes that in Muslim societies
religious elites had it in their power to rouse or placate public opinion [...] [i]t was
through using the threat of rousing the mob that the ulama¯[religious elites] when
all else failedcould restrain the authorities, who recognized the dangers behind the
threat.
Political rulers seem to have generally satised the demands of the religious elites
to the extent necessary to prevent rebellion. Ibn Taymiyya a well-known medieval
thinkerprovides one of the more striking expositions of this historical relationship.
He notes that the temporal princes, in close collaboration with the ulama, carry
out their religious and political functions as the sharia directs and receive in return
loyal obedience from the people.3
In Islamic Egypt, military elites served as the political rulers or sultans (hence-
forth I equate political rulers with military elites).4 They appointed inuential reli-
gious scholars to high-ranking judicial positions. Judicial appointees took care of the
day-to-day workings of the legal system and worked to guarantee popular support
for the incumbent regime (Lapidus 1984, p. 134; Petry 1981, pp. 232-240). In re-
turn, religious leaders developed sizeable fortunes which were directly linked to the
number of individuals they could inuence.5 In addition to administering Islamic law
and developing sizeable personal fortunes, inuential ulama sought to protect their
constituents from abuses. These abuses included conscations and high levels of
taxation.
The head judge stood at the head of ulama networks in Islamic Egypt and could
provide massive popular backing(Lapidus 1984, p. 134). One scholar of medieval
Egypt has described the head judge as having vast personal authority among the
ulama (Lapidus 1984, p. 136). Another notes that [i]f the holders of any one
3Paraphrased in Gibb (1955b, p. 24)
4Throughout the remaining historical section I focus on the Mamluk period (both before and
after the Ottoman invasion) due to source constraints. For the similarity of the institutional frame-
work in earlier (Islamic) periods see Lapidus (1975).
5See Al-Sayyid Marsot (1972, p. 156), Al-Sayyid Marsot (1973, pp. 133-134) and Lapidus (1984,
p. 141). One estimate puts at 70,000-80,000 the number of men that the most inuential ulama
could mobilize (Al-Sayyid Marsot 1972, p. 151).
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o¢ ce can be considered the voice of the ulama and the articulate representatives
of the civilian sector, the chief justices can(Petry 1981, p. 231). Given this fact,
throughout the remainder of the paper I refer to the head judge and the ulama
interchangeably.
2 Nile Floods and the Political Power of the Head
Judge
The previous discussion suggests that concessions from the military to the head judge
were a function of the number of individuals the head judge could inuence. This
section provides historical evidence that deviant Nile oods increased this number
which in turn led to an increase in the judges political inuence.
2.1 The Nile Flood
Agriculture in the Nile basin was historically heavily dependent on the annual Nile
ood. A complex system of dikes and irrigation networks helped harness the oods
agricultural potential, making Egyptian agricultural yields some of the highest in the
pre-modern world.6
The Niles annual ood usually began in earnest in July and had crested (at the
latest) in October. Once the Nile began to subside in October, peasants across the
basin sowed a wide variety of crops including wheat, barley, broad beans, chick-peas
and lentils. Although other crops were grown and harvested on some land throughout
the year (with the aid of waterwheels and other irrigation devices), the Nile ood
irrigated the vast majority of crops. These crops were harvested in April and May.
Ethiopian monsoon runo¤ determined the size of the annual Nile ood. Recent
research has linked variation in this monsoon runo¤ to sunspots (Ruzmaikin et al.
2006), suggesting the Niles summer ood level can be considered exogenous. I
6This section draws on Cooper (1976), Frantz-Murphy (1986), Tsugitaka (1997). See also Borsch
(2005, pp. 34-39) for a detailed discussion.
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maintain this exogeneity assumption throughout the paper.
When the Niles summer ood signicantly deviated above or below its optimal
level (these deviant episodes are henceforth referred to as Nile failures) agricultural
output sharply dropped the following harvest.7 While some Nile failures caused little
more than passing shortages, large Nile deviations induced full-blown famines. More
severe famines led to widespread unrest and armageddon-like conditions. Death rates
during these episodes could reach rates of over 500 people a day in Cairo (Maqrizi
1997 [1441], IV, p. 376).8
The severity of a Nile shock primarily depended on the extent to which the
Nile deviated from its optimal level. The historical record is somewhat ambiguous
regarding the frequency of shocks severe enough to cause crises. One scholar suggests
that such shocks occurred once every 8 years between 949 and 1233 CE (Hassan
2007) while another suggests these occurred every 17 years between 1600 and 1800
CE (Raymond 1973, pp. 81-106). These di¤erences in the frequency of Nile-induced
crises may have been driven by long-term variation in Nile ood cycles, improvements
in agricultural technology or by di¤erences in the precision with which the historical
sources recorded such events.
2.2 Nile Failure, Popular Support and the Political Power
of the Head Judge
A slow or excessively rapid Nile rise during the summer months unsettled the popu-
lation. Food prices rose as individuals hoarded grain in preparation for shortages in
the following year. Consequently, although the agricultural e¤ects of a one-shot Nile
failure did not obtain until harvest the following year the treatment e¤ectof Nile
failure began before the physical absence of foodstu¤s occurred. If the Nile failed,
7Here (and below) I focus on Nile droughts for expositional clarity. See Raymond (1973, p. 83);
Sabra (2000, pp. 152-153) or Petry (1994, p. 105) for evidence that excessive Nile oods had similar
e¤ects.
8Estimates of Cairos population range between 500,000 and 600,000 in the 14th century (Ray-
mond 2002, p. 136).
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prices of wheat could double or even quadruple. The price increases began at the
rst sign of an abnormally slow (rapid) rise of the Nile during the summer month
prior to the Niles crest (below I assume, following historical evidence, that evidence
of Nile ood failure began to be revealed in July).
Grain prices decreased the following year if the Nile ood was adequate, although
grain prices generally remained elevated until the harvest was collected in April/May
of the following year (Maqrizi 1994 [1405], p. 51). In other words, the most severe
e¤ects of a one-shot Nile failure on grain prices appear to have lasted roughly from
July of the solar year of the Nile failure (denote this year by t) through June of the
following solar year (t+1). Grain prices remained abnormally high, however, through
April/May of the solar year t+2 (when the harvest irrigated with the ood in year
t+1 was collected).
As prices rose following a Nile failure, thousands assembled in search of grain.
These groups rioted, sacked stores and attacked government o¢ cials.9 One historian
has summed up these riots by noting that when hungry, [the people] were ready to
rise even against powerful rulers (Shoshan 1993, p. 58). During periods of Nile-
induced bread riots, demonstrations blaming the incumbent sultan for the Niles
failure particularly alarmed the ruling coalition. The sultans coalition (recall that I
use the sultan to denote the head of the military) appears to have been wary of rival
military factions using these rioters to aid a revolt.10
In order to prevent such a coordinated uprising, the sultan worked to purchase
popular support by distributing food and importing grain. If riots continued despite
food distribution (which often occurred due to insu¢ cient stockpiles and imperfect
storage technology), the sultan and his coalition could use military force to suppress
the rioters, although they generally appear to have preferred to enlist the support of
the ulama in their e¤orts to calm the populace (Raymond 1974, p. 420).
9For peasant assemblies and grain riots see Sabra (2000, pp. 136, 142, 155) and Shoshan (1980).
For attacks on government o¢ cials see Perho (2001, p. 112) and Maqrizi (1405, p. 29).
10See Maqrizi (1997 [1441], IV, p. 368) ; Shoshan (1993, p. 53) and Taghri Birdi (1976 [1468], V,
p. 120; VI, p. 63). See Grossman and Medoza (2003) for a theoretical discussion of how economic
downturns can lead to popular unrest and appropriative competition.
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During the summer months, the ulama organized mass rain prayers and other
processions to plead for divine aid to cause the Nile to ood.11 If the summer ended
in Nile failure, widespread famine and epidemic disease outbreaks followed. During
the year treatedby Nile failure one nds references to exceptionally large groups
of individuals attending mosque services, rain prayers and congregating around in-
uential members of the ulama. The ulama who generally supported the incumbent
sultanseem to have used their increased inuence to calm the masses.12
It is important to stress that the exact mechanism through which Nile failures
increased popular support for members of the ulama (and consequently allowed them
to quell riots) is unclear. Some historical passages stress the importance of religious
beliefs (i.e. peasants viewed deviant Nile oods as divine punishment for sinful
behavior and followed the religious elites in an attempt to garner Gods mercy).
Others suggest the pragmatic fact that sustained popular coordination to extract
concessions from the sultan was impossible without ulama leadership.13
Regardless of the mechanism, the historical record suggests that the ulama used
Nile-induced increases in popular support to extract greater concessions from the
sultan. One historian, for example, notes that during periods of Nile failure the
sultan would bow to ulama[...] pressure and enforce decrees against [...] prostitu-
11For an example of a rain prayer see Taghri Birdi (1976 [1468], III , pp. 77-78). For its use
in calming bread riots see Taghri Birdi (1990 [1468], p. 234). For an example of a procession see
Shoshan (1993, p. 62).
12For an example of abnormally large mosque attendance see Taghri Birdi (1976 [1468], p. 233).
For public readings of Bukhari (a famous religious text) to calm the su¤ering populace after the
Nile had failed see Maqrizi (1997 [1441], IV, p. 366). For large crowds congregating around the
head judge see Maqrizi (1997 [1441], VI, p. 100).
13For studies linking economic shocks to increases in religious intensity see McCann (1999) or
Chen (2010). Among a large literature stressing the coordinating importance of religious authorities
in the Islamic world see Lewis (1953) or al-Sayyid Marsot (1973). For an example of a judge aiding
coordination across city quarters see Lapidus (1984, p. 166). For coordination in the Friday sermon
and at mosques and educational centers see Al-Sayyid Marsot (1972, p. 153; 1973, p. 133) and
Raymond (1974, p. 432). For the coordinating e¤ects of fatwas (legal opinions) see Maqrizi (1441,
VI, pp. 12, 227); Taghri Birdi (1468, I, pp. 88-91), Lapidus (1984, pp. 152-153) and Tyan (1960,
pp. 116, 424).
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tion, hashish eating, beer drinking, the wearing of immodest or over-luxurious dress
[or] Christian and Jewish functionaries lording it over Muslims(Irwin 1986, p. 50).
The fact that these measures were more likely to be enforced during periods of Nile
failure suggest that religious elites had greater bargaining power during such periods.
The primary sources also indicate that religious leaders were better able to extract
monetary concessions and other perquisites from the military during deviant Nile
episodes.14 Religious authorities passed some of these concessions on to the populace,
routinely calling for the lifting of unjust taxes and reimbursement of those taxed
(Jabarti 1994 [1822], III, p. 403) in exchange for their continued support during Nile
failures.
2.3 Conceptual Framework
The historical evidence suggests that deviant Nile oods increased popular support
for the head judge. The intuition for how an increase in popular support can lead to
an increase in the political inuence of the head judge (which, recall, I equate with
increased monetary transfers to the judiciary) is straightforward. An increase in
popular support for the head judge means that the threat of popular revolt becomes
more dangerous to the incumbent sultan (higher probability of success). Conse-
quently, the incumbent sultan has to transfer greater resources to the head judge
(who might pass some of these on to the populace) in order to prevent him from
sanctioning a revolt.15
In the empirical section I use the judge dismissal probability as a proxy for these
14For examples of increased monetary payments to the ulama following a Nile failure see Maqrizi
(1997 [1441], IV, p. 269) and Taghri Birdi (1976 [1468], p. 233). For an example of increased
perquisites see the e¤ect of Nile failure on the ability of the ulama to ride horses in Taghri Birdi
(1990 [1468], pp. 220, 238).
15The assumption of a static framework will not alter these qualitative implications as long as the
judge cannot (or will not) change the existing institutional structure. Since there are only isolated
and short-lived examples of religious authorities establishing their own political entities I ignore
this possibility. See Acemoglu et al. (2010) for a related theoretical framework and the conclusion
for a brief discussion.
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increased monetary transfers. To understand the relationship between the two, de-
note the monetary transfers from the sultan to the judge by Y ((Nile); Nile) where
(Nile) denotes popular support and Nile is an index measuring the Niles devia-
tion from its optimal level. Write the judges outside option (if he doesnt sanction
a revolt) as (Nile). The judge will be dismissed (or quit) if 1(Y () < ) where
1 denotes the indicator function equal to one if the argument in parentheses is true
and I assume that if indi¤erent the judge remains in power.
I allow for heterogeneity in  and  across judges. For each level of Nile ood the
probability of dismissal is given by Pr(Y (;Nile) < ). As long as the Nile-induced
changes in the levels of the judges outside option and his -held-constant monetary
o¤er from the sultan are roughly equal (which seems a plausible assumption), in-
creases in the Niles deviation should decrease the probability of judge dismissal by
increasing Y (through ) relative to .
3 The Data
3.1 Head Judge Changes
Ibn Hajar (1998 [1449]) provides the month and year of head judge changes. These
data are given by hijri months and years. Hijri years are lunar years consisting of
354 days (355 days in a lunar leap year) and have twelve months which alternate
between 29 and 30 days. The rst day of the rst hijri year corresponds to the solar
date July 16th 622 CE (solar year is henceforth used to denote CE years), the day
the Prophet Muhammad made his Hijra or migration from Mecca to Medina. Since
the lunar year or AH year (henceforth both notations are used to denote hijri years)
is approximately 11 days shorter than the solar year, the rst day of the lunar year
slowly cycles backwardsthrough the solar year.
The relationship between lunar and solar years can been seen in gure one. The
brackets denote the solar years 1000-1015 CE. The vertical lines denote the rst day
of each lunar year. The solar date corresponding to the start of each lunar year
is given above the highest horizontal line. Lunar years run from vertical line to
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vertical line and are numbered in the row marked lunar year. Inspection of gure
one shows that the vertical lines occur earlier in the solar year as time goes on. This
is a graphical representation of the backwards cycling of the lunar year through the
solar year. Consequently, the lunar months have no calendar regularity. This has
important implications for the correct assignment of the Nile ood data as discussed
below.
Although Ibn Hajars data are thought to be generally reliable (Escovitz 1984, p.
5), information regarding how a head judge left power is not available for the majority
of the head judges. For expositional ease I refer to these changes as dismissals
throughout the text regardless of whether the judge died in o¢ ce, was dismissed
or quit. In practice, the missing information on how a judge was released does not
threaten the empirical strategy below since I assume that the Nile ood level is
exogenous.16
Of the 245 judge changes reported by Ibn Hajar on the interval [20, 10th month
of 842 AH] the year of dismissal was available (or could be imputed) for 239 changes
(98%) and the year and month of dismissal was available for 209 changes (85%).
Missing dismissal dates were imputed as follows. Ibn Hajar (1998 [1449], pp. 4-
21) provides a poem that lists Egypts judges in chronological order.17 When a judges
dismissal date was missing, I replaced this missing date with the appointment date
of the judge that chronologically followed him in the poem. When the appointment
month/year of the following judge was also missing, the dismissal month/year was
left blank. Judge changes missing the month but containing the year of change were
assigned the month 6.
When there was more than one head judge after 1265 CE I included the dismissal
16One might worry that deviant Nile oods increased the probability of a judge dying in o¢ ce.
Since in practice I nd a negative relationship between deviant Nile oods and head judge dismissal
such an e¤ect would bias the results towards zero. In addition, it should be noted that the historical
record contains many example both of the head judge constraining the sultans behavior (e.g. Ibn
Hajar 1998 [1449], pp. 68, 240) and attempting to constrain the sultan and being dismissed or
quitting when the sultan refused to comply (e.g. Ibn Hajar 1998 [1449], pp. 231, 392).
17A spreadsheet documenting the construction of this data set is available upon request.
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date of the Shai judge in the main series (the Shai school was the most inuential
in Egypt during the Mamluk era).18 After 1265 CE I created 3 additional series for
the head judges of the three other law schools in an identical manner to those for
the Shai school.
Since the head judge data do not completely cover the hijri year 842, I discard
it from the sample. The data set consequently contains 239 judge dismissals on the
interval [20,841 AH].
3.2 Assigning Lunar Months to Solar Months
Although the head judge change data is given by lunar months and years, Nile oods
followed the solar calendar (see section 2.1 for a discussion of the Niles seasonal ood
pattern). To correctly assign each Nile ood to lunar months it treated I developed
a mapping from lunar months/years to solar months/years using the tables provided
in Freeman-Grenville (1995).19 Their conversion tables assume that the 12 months
of the lunar year alternate between 30 and 29 days. In addition, they give lunar leap
years on pages 18-72.
To create the mapping between the lunar and solar months I rst calculated the
percentage of each lunar month occupied by a given solar month. I then assigned
a lunar month to a solar month if the solar month occupied 50% or more (15 days
or more) of the lunar month. When the lunar month was evenly divided between
two solar months I used the earlier of the two solar months. Since the solar year is
longer than the lunar year, sometimes 2 di¤erent lunar months are assigned to one
solar month (that is, one solar month occupied 50% or more of two lunar months).
18There was also more than one head judge briey under the Fatimids. During the Fatimid
period I included the Ismaili (Shia) head judge since the head judges were generally Ismaili under
the Fatimids.
19I use the Julian Calendar as a proxy for the solar (tropical) calendar for simplicity, while
recognizing that this calendar slowly diverged from the solar calendar. By 1582 this calendar had
diverged from the tropical calendar by 10 days.
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3.3 Nile Flood Data
In the empirical section, I use the maximum Nile ood level each year to construct a
metric of Nile-induced economic shocks. Egyptian political leaders were interested in
gathering this maximum level and other ood statistics to both estimate agricultural
tax receipts (Cooper 1976) and forecast future ood levels (Petry 1994, p. 105). To
this end, they constructed Nilometers.
The Nilometer on the island of Rauda (Cairo) was among Egypts most elabo-
rate.20 This Nilometer was sta¤ed by a guardian who provided daily measurements
to government o¢ cials. Although the guardians original records are lost, two his-
torians in the 15th century compiled copies of the Niles historical minimum and
maximum levels.
The historians Ibn al-Hijazi and Taghri Birdi provide two separate sets of Nile
ood data. Hijazis (1470) statistics cover the interval [1,873] AH, whereas Taghri
Birdis statistics span the years [20,855] AH.21 Both data sets appear to be copies of
the original records kept by the guardian of the Nilometer on the island of Rauda.
The authors give the yearly maximum and minimum level of the Nile ood by lunar
year.
Scholars agree that these data provide credible estimates of the true Nile ood
levels and Hijazis data have been extensively used in the climatology literature. The
data, however, contain two sources of measurement error. First, both data sets have
transcription errors. I show in the appendix that this source of error attenuates the
coe¢ cients of interest under plausible assumptions. Second, both authors assigned
the yearly Nile ood maxima and minima to lunar years. The assignment of the
ood levels by lunar year introduces an additional source of measurement error if
left uncorrected.
Figure one highlights the problems introduced by the assignment of Nile oods to
lunar years. To better understand these problems, consider the ood that occurred
in the year 1008 CE. Hijazi recorded this ood level as having occurred in the year
20This section draws on Popper (1951).
21Taghri Birdis data are drawn from Sami (1916, introduction, pp. 4-9).
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398 AH (the solar year ood recorded by Hijazi in each lunar year is given in the
nal row of gure one). The year 398 AH spanned the interval [17, September
1007; 4, September 1008]. Recall, however, that information regarding the maximum
Nile ood level began to be revealed in July (see section 2.1). Consequently, if I
assigned the ood recorded by Hijazi in 398 AH to that lunar year, only the lunar
dates corresponding to the solar interval [1, July 1008; 4, September 1008] would be
correctly assigned. I would spuriously assign to the remainder of dates in the lunar
year 398 the ood that occurred in 1008 CE when in reality these dates were treated
by the Nile ood that occurred in 1007 CE.
To further complicate matters, neither Hijazi nor Taghri Birdi appear to have
necessarily recorded Nile oods in the lunar year in which the maximum ood level
occurred. Hijazi seems to have assigned solar year oods to lunar years by convention.
The mapping between the ood levels recorded by lunar years and the CE year in
which the ood actually occurred is given in Toussoun (1925).
Although there is enough information to construct such a mapping for Hijazis
data, it is not possible to determine which solar year ood Taghri Birdi recorded in
each lunar year.22 For this reason I use Hijazis data throughout the remainder of the
paper. I show in the appendix, however, that merging Taghri Birdis ood data by
lunar year yields qualitatively similar results (when the lagged ood value is used).
Equipped with Hijazis ood data assigned to CE years, I merged it to the head
judge data set as follows. I dened a Nile year to run from July through June of
the solar year (since these were approximately the dates treated by each Nile ood
level). I then assigned the Nile ood from CE year t to the lunar months in the
interval [July, t; June, t+1]. Taghri Birdis ood data was merged by lunar years
without correction.
For most of the empirical section, I use the Nile year as the unit of observation.
22The mapping from lunar to solar years is made possible in Hijazis data by the fact that he
skips every 34 lunar year. Taghri Birdis data does not following such a pattern, making the exact
mapping between lunar and solar years unclear. See Popper (1951, pp. 123-149) for a detailed
discussion.
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Collapsing the monthly data down to the Nile year level was straightforward. Note
that for Taghri Birdis data, the ood level assigned to each Nile year in regressions at
the Nile year level is the weighted average of the ood level recorded in the lunar years
contained in that Nile year. The appendix provides details regarding the number of
observations at the yearly and monthly levels.
The original data are given in cubits and ngers. I used the mapping provided
by Popper (1951, pp. 104-105, table 1) to convert cubits and ngers to meters above
sea-level.
Figure two presents the recorded yearly Nile ood maximums and minimums as
reported by Hijazi (upper graph) and Taghri Birdi (lower graph). The inferior hori-
zontal axis marks lunar years, and the superior horizontal axis gives the correspond-
ing CE year (the ticked solar years were assigned using the solar year corresponding
to the start of the lunar year). The left hand vertical axis details the ood level in
meters above sea level and the right hand vertical axis measures the ood level in
cubits and ngers. On the right hand axis only the level of 16 cubits (plenitude) is
ticked. This level was originally (after the Muslim conquest) considered the optimal
ood level.
Examination of gure two reveals that the Nile ood level slowly trended up-
wards over time. Sediment accumulation slowly caused both the rise of the Nile
bed and the surrounding land (Popper 1951, pp. 241-247; Borsch 2000). For this
reason, throughout the empirical section I consider the realNile ood deviation
by examining its deviation from a time trend.23
4 Nile Floods and Judge Dismissal
I begin by examining the relationship between head judge dismissal and Nile ood
deviations (recall that for the remainder of the main text I use Hijazis data as
explained above) using the Nile year as the unit of observation. Figure three provides
the non-parametric estimate of the relationship between head judge dismissal and
23I show in the data appendix that the results are robust to alternative residual calculations.
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the deviation of the Nile oods from a linear trend. Vertical lines mark the upper and
lower cuto¤s dening the top 10% of Nile ood deviations. The negative relationship
is striking and suggests that Nile ood deviations a¤ected the probability of judge
dismissal.
To investigate this relationship formally, I create a dummy variable Faminet
equal to one if the Nile ood residual from a linear trend is in the upper 5% or lower
5% of the ood distribution.24 Although under plausible assumptions a continuous
metric such as the square of the ood residualshas the advantage of yielding con-
sistent results when instrumenting for one series with the other, in practice these
results are less robust and powerful than the extreme value specication used
throughout the paper (although such results are often signicant at conventional
levels). Moreover, the extreme value specication used closely corresponds with
historical and empirical evidence that only deviant Nile oods signicantly empow-
ered the head judge (i.e. the true functional relationship is closer to a step function
than a parabola).
The baseline regression is the linear probability model of the form:
Judgetd = d + Faminetd + "td (1)
where t indexes Nile years and d denote decade dummies.25 The variable Judgetd
is a scaled dummy variable (to facilitate presentation) equal to one hundred if the
head judge at the start of Nile year t is dismissed on the interval (t,t+1). This
type of specication is closely related to duration models and particularly suits the
empirical setting (see Lancaster 1990, pp. 10-13).
OLS estimates of (1) are reported in table one. The rst panel uses the Nile
maximum to calculate the dummy variable Faminetd. In this panel, the rst column
omits covariates whereas the second column includes decade dummy variables. In
24The 10% cuto¤ was chosen using the historical evidence that deviant Nile oods occurred
approximately every 8 years for a subset of the period covered by the data. As I show in the
appendix, alternative cuto¤s yield similar results.
25Probit or logit specications yield qualitatively similar results throughout the paper and are
consequently omitted.
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both specications, the estimated relationship is negative and statistically signicant.
Newey-West standard errors with 7 lags are reported in parentheses. Results in table
two add two leads and lags to equation (1) and show that the e¤ect of deviant Nile
oods on judge dismissal is concentrated in the impactyear.
Columns (3) and (4) of table one report the result using the disaggregated data
at the lunar month level. Here the dependent variable is equal to one hundred if the
incumbent judge at the start of lunar month h is dismissed on the interval (h,h+1).
The third column again omits covariates while the fourth column includes solar year
and month dummies. The point estimates are again statistically signicant (Newey-
West standard errors with 17 lags are reported in parentheses).
In the second panel, I use the Nile minimum to construct a placebo Faminetd.
Rainfall in the Niles equatorial catchment area (which includes Western Kenya,
Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo
and the Democratic Republic of Congo) determined this minimum (as opposed to
the Ethiopian monsoon runo¤ which determined the maximum). The Niles yearly
minimum and maximum levels were imperfectly correlated and often did not move
in sync (Hassan 2007).
These data allow me to construct the placebo Faminetd equal to one if the Nile
ood minimum was in the top 5% or lower 5% of the minimum ood distribution.
Since the Nile ood maximum determined agricultural productivity whereas the Nile
minimum had no e¤ect on this productivity, I expect the Nile ood minimum to not
be related to head judge dismissals. Results in panel two of table one are consistent
with this prediction and show that the Nile ood minimum was not related to head
judge dismissals.26
The estimated magnitudes of the relationship between deviant Nile oods and
head judge dismissal are both statistically signicant and economically meaningful.
The smaller (in absolute value) point estimates in columns one and three suggest that
deviant Nile oods decreased the yearly probability of dismissal by approximately 9
26The drop in the number of observations is due to missing data in Hijazis Nile minimum series.
Limiting both series to years in which both the Nile maximum and minimum are given by Hijazi
yields similar results.
18
percentage points and the monthly probability of dismissal by roughly one percentage
point (or using the binomial approximation by approximately 12 percentage points
over a lunar year). Since the monthly probability of judge dismissal is 2.2 percentage
points and the yearly probability is 21 percentage points this suggests that deviant
Nile oods reduced the probability of judge dismissal by roughly one-half.
5 Judge Dismissal, Popular Support and Political
Inuence
Although the results in the previous section demonstrate a negative relationship
between deviant Nile oods and head judge dismissal, the causal path generating
this result remains unclear. The historical evidence presented in the second section
suggests a causal path that can be summarized schematically as follows: deviant
Nile!"popular support!"political inuence!#probability of dismissal. Alternative
causal paths, however, are consistent with the observed reduced form relationship.
This section addresses such concerns by using historical variation in the maximum
number of individuals a head judge could inuence. I use three sources of variation
in popular adherence to the head judges denomination (school of law). First, I
observe that during the Fatimid dynasty (969-1169 CE) both the ruling dynasty and
the head judge were Shia (with a few isolated exceptions) whereas the overwhelming
majority of Egypts Muslim population was Sunni. Second, I note that the Egyptian
population slowly converted to Islam, giving the head judge an increasingly large
constituency.Third, I use the fact that after 1265 CE the military appointed four
head judges. These four head judges represented the four main Sunni law schools
(Shai, Maliki, Hana and Hanbali), each of which had di¤erent levels of adherence
among Egyptian Muslims.
The reasoning behind the empirical strategy using these sources of variation can
be understood as follows. Recall that the proposed causal path can be written as
deviant Nile!"popular support!#probability of dismissal. Suppose the extreme
case in which no one in the populace shares the head judges religious a¢ liation.
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Then I would not expect deviant Nile oods to have an e¤ect on judge dismissal
since during periods of Nile famines the populace would presumably rally behind
other (possibly religious) leaders. Similarly, if di¤erent head judges have di¤erent
stocks of potential adherents I expect the head judge with the larger stock to
experience a larger decrease in the probability of dismissal than judges with smaller
stocks.27
Table three presents results using these three sources of variation. The rst col-
umn presents a regression identical to (1) adding the interaction term Faminet 
Shiat, where the variable Shiat is equal to one if the head judge was Shia. Column
(2) includes the term FaminetPercentMuslimt where PercentMuslimt is the per-
centage of the population that is Muslim in each year as given in Bulliet (1979). The
F-statistic and corresponding p-value testing the hypothesis that both interaction
terms are zero is given in the row labeled F-Stat.
Results in column (2) are consistent with the proposed causal path and suggest
that deviant Nile oods increased judge dismissal when the head judge was Shia.
For all other head judges (who were Sunni like the overwhelming majority of Egypts
Muslim population), the results suggest that the e¤ect of Nile failures on judge
dismissal became increasingly negative as the population converted to Islam.
Column (3) limits the sample to after 1265 CE, and reports results running re-
gression (1) for the Shai, Maliki, Hanaand Hanbali head judges using a seemingly
unrelated regression framework. Although statistics of the distribution of Egypts
Muslims across the four law schools during this period do not exist, there is broad
scholarly agreement that the Egyptian population was mainly Sha¯¯¬(Nielsen 1984,
p. 172) during the period covered by the data after 1265 CE. This popular inuence
meant that the Shai head judge was the highest rankingof the four head judges
(Escovitz 1984, p. 25) and led one medieval observer to note that any sultan who did
not adhere to the Shai law school was quickly ousted or killed(cited in Jackson
1996, p. 33). Escovitz (1984, p. 25-27) suggests that after the Shai judge the Maliki
judge was the most inuential, followed by the Hana and the Hanbali judges.
27Here I implicitly assume that the percentage of the head judges potential stock of popular
support that actively supports him during normaltimes is constant across time and law school.
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The coe¢ cient for the Shai head judge is given in the row marked Faminet in
column (3) of table three. Those for the Maliki, Hana and Hanbali head judges
are provided in the fourth, fth and sixth rows. The F-statistic testing the equality
of the coe¢ cients with its corresponding p-value is again given in the row labeled
F-Stat. Results show that Nile failures were associated with statistically signicant
decreases in the probability of dismissal of the Shai and Maliki head judges (who
seem to have been those who had the greatest popular inuence). The data reject
the null-hypothesis that Nile-induced famines had similar e¤ects on the probability
of dismissal of all the head judges.
When taken in unison, these results cast doubt on alternative explanations for the
results. One alternative explanation is that the sultan was more superstitious during
famines and this increased superstition made him less likely to dismiss the head
judge. The results render this explanation implausible since the head of the military
was always Muslim yet the e¤ect of Nile failures on judge dismissal increases as the
percent of the population that was Muslim increases. Additionally, the head judge
and the military were both Shia under the Fatimids, yet the negative relationship
between Nile famines and judge dismissal does not hold.
Results also render unlikely the scenario in which the results are simply a re-
ection of a decrease in the probability of dismissal of all government sta¤ during
deviant Nile oods. If this were the case, the e¤ect of Nile failures on judge dismissal
should not vary based on the judges law school. Results in column (3) of table three
are not consistent with this scenario.
6 Conclusion
A distinguished line of scholars have stressed that religious leaders can derive political
inuence from their control over popular support. Results in this paper are consistent
with such scholarship. Deviant Nile oods decreased the dismissal probability of
Egypts highest ranking religious authority by roughly one-half. Historical evidence
suggests that this result is indicative of increased political power stemming from an
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increase in popular support for the religious authority.
To better understand the extent to which the statistical relationship reects this
historical narrative I used three sources of variation in the head judges popular sup-
port. Results using these sources of variation cast doubt on alternative explanations
for the decrease in the dismissal probability.
While data limitations do not allow an investigation of the mechanism leading
from deviant Nile oods to increased popular support for the religious authorities,
the evidence does suggest (in a reduced-form manner) that Nile-induced economic
downturns helped temporarily solve the collective action problem. Acemoglu and
Robinson (2000a, 2001, 2006) have argued that such periods can provide a democratic
window of opportunity.
Egypt did not democratize during periods of famine. Religious leaders instead
appear to have used Nile-induced increases in popular support to extract increased
concessions for both themselves and the populace. This result is consistent with
historical evidence that religious leaders protected their positions by discouraging
revolutionary developments (Lapidus 1984, p. 153) and suggests that future re-
search investigating the political role of religious leaders (perhaps as rent-extracting
elites as in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b, 2008)) may shed light on institutional
outcomes in many areas of the world.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Bias Introduced by Measurement Error
Without loss of generality consider the regression at the Nile year level without
covariates:
Judget = 0 + 1Famine

t + "t
where Judget is a dummy variable equal to one if the incumbent judge at time t
is dismissed on the interval (t,t+1) and Faminet is a dummy variable equal to one
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if the correctly measured Nile ood is in the top 5% or the lower 5% of the ood
distribution. I assume that all necessary moments exist.
I observe DevNilet = DevNilet + t and Faminet = 1(DevNilet  c5) +
1(DevNilet  c95) where c5 is the lower 5% cuto¤ of the observed Nile ood distri-
bution and c95 denotes the cuto¤ for the upper 5% of this distribution. Assuming
that E["tjFaminet] = E["t] (a su¢ cient condition for this is the joint independence
ofDevNilet ; t and "t) standard arguments imply that the coe¢ cient ^1 converges in
probability to 1[Pr(Famine

t = 1jFaminet = 1) Pr(Faminet = 1jFaminet = 0)].
Using Bayesrule this can be written as 1[
10
9
Pr(Faminet = 1jFaminet = 1)   19 ].
Consequently, ^1 will converge to an attenuated constant that has the same sign as
1 as long as Pr(Faminet = 1jFaminet = 1)  0:10.
7.2 Number of Observations
I used the intersection of all three data sets (judge changes and the two Nile ood
data sets) which span the interval [20, 841 AH]. Since the year 841 AH ended on
June 23, 1438 CE, the data set contains 797 Nile years [641,1437]. In other words,
the data cover the interval [July, 641; June, 1438 CE].
When regressions are run at the lunar level there are 9857 observations. This
number can be understood as follows. If I ran the regressions at the solar month
level I would have 797*12=9564 observations. There are 293 solar years containing
13 lunar months and the total number of monthly observations at the lunar month
level is 9564+293=9857.
7.3 Robustness Checks, Measurement Error and Placebo
Table four presents estimates of equation (1) including decades dummies and the
interaction term Faminet  Shiat (and are thus comparable to those reported in
column (1) of table three). The rst panel of table four varies the famine cuto¤
used in equation (1). The rst row uses the top 5% of ood deviations and the
second row uses the top 10% of ood deviations calculated using dynasty-specic
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cuto¤s. Although statistical signicance varies by cuto¤, results are signicant at
conventional levels. The second panel details the results using residuals calculated
from an AR(10) and a moving average with 10 lags.28 These results show that the
negative relationship between Nile famines and judge dismissal is robust to the way
in which the Nile residuals are calculated.
Panel three provides the results using Taghri Birdis data to calculate the variable
Faminet. Recall that Taghri Birdis data cannot be correctly assigned to solar years.
The results in panel three, however, show that Taghri Birdis lagged data produces
statistically signicant results, whereas the placebo calculated using the minimum
level is statistically insignicant.29
28Lag length for the autoregression was chosen using the Schwarz criteria with maximum lag
length set to 20.
29The coe¢ cient on the contemporaneousood (assigned by lunar years) is statistically in-
signicant.
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Figure 1: Lunar and Solar Years
Brackets denote solar years. Vertical lines mark the first day of the lunar
year denoted to the right. The solar year of the Nile flood Hijazi assigned
to each lunar year is provided in the final row.
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Figure 2: Maximum and Minimum Nile Flood Levels





























Figure 3: Nile Variation and Probability of Dismissal
Graph details (raw) non-parametric relationship between changes in the
judgeship and the Nile maximum’s deviation from a linear trend as
reported by Hijazi. Vertical lines mark the top 5% and lower 5% of the
maximum flood distribution.
Table 1: Flood Deviations and Judge Dismissal
=100 if judge at t was dismissed on (t,t+1)
Nile Flood Year Lunar Month
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel 1: Nile Max.
FamineNileY ear -9.12∗∗ -15.50∗∗∗ -1.13∗∗∗ -1.71∗∗
(4.34) (5.75) (0.42) (0.70)
N 797 797 9857 9857
Panel 2: Placebo
(Nile Min.)
FamineNileY ear 5.69 6.63 0.41 0.45
(5.29) (5.41) (0.55) (0.76)
N 750 750 9275 9275
Decade Dummies? No Yes No No
Solar Year Dummies? No No No Yes
Solar Month Dummies? No No No Yes
Notes: estimates of equation (1) reported in panel 1. The dependent variable is 100*
a dummy variable equal to one if the incumbent judge at time t was dismissed on the
interval (t,t+1). t is measured by Nile flood years ([July,June] of the solar calendar)
in columns (1) and (2) and by lunar month in columns (3) and (4). FamineNileY ear
is a dummy variable equal to one if the Nile flood was in the upper 5% or lower 5%
of the flood distribution. Panel 2 constructs the variable FamineNileY ear using the
minimum Nile level. This variable is equal to one if the minimum level was in the
upper 5% or lower 5% of the minimum flood distribution. Coefficients are reported
with Newey-West standard errors with 7 lags (Nile year) and 17 lags (lunar month) in
parentheses in panel 1. Robust standard errors are presented in panel 2 due to gaps
in the minimum flood data. ∗∗∗,∗∗and ∗indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels.












Decade Dummies? No Yes
N 793 793
Notes: The dependent variable is 100* a dummy variable equal to one if the incumbent
judge at the start of Nile year t was dismissed on the interval (t,t+1). Faminet is a
dummy variable equal to one if the Nile flood was in the upper 5% or lower 5% of the
flood distribution. Coefficients are reported with Newey-West standard errors with 7
lags in parentheses. ∗∗∗,∗∗and ∗indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Table 3: Popular Support and Judge Dismissal
=100 if incumbent judge was dismissed on (t,t+1)
(1) (2) (3)
Faminet -18.14∗∗∗ -0.04 -21.97∗∗∗
(6.19) (10.68) (6.08)
Faminet ∗ Shiat 20.91 37.90∗∗
(14.50) (15.13)








F − Stat 5.19∗∗∗ 2.69∗∗
[p− value] [0.01] [0.04]
Decade Dummies? Yes Yes Yes
Sample All All Post 1265
N 797 797 172
Estimation OLS OLS SUR
Notes: The dependent variable is 100* a dummy variable equal to one if the incumbent
judge at the start of the Nile year t was dismissed on the interval (t,t+1). Shiat is
a dummy variable equal to one if the head judge was Shia. PercentMuslimt is the
percent of the Egyptian population in year t that was Muslim (taken from Bulliet
1979). Results in column (3) are from a seemingly unrelated regression estimation of
equation (1) run separately for judges of the four Sunni law schools. The coefficient
for the Shafii head judge is reported in the row labeled Faminet. The entries in
the row F − Stat provide the test statistic and p-value testing the hypothesis that
both interaction terms are equal to zero in column (2) and testing the hypothesis
that the four head judge coefficients are equal in (3). Coefficients are reported with
Newey-West standard errors with 7 lags in parentheses in columns (1) and (2) and
SUR-robust standard errors in column (3). ∗∗∗,∗∗and ∗indicate significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels.
Table 4: Robustness Checks
Coef. SE N
Panel 1: Cutoff
Top 5% -19.83∗∗∗ 4.37 797
Top 10%, Dynasty -10.53∗ 5.94 797
Panel 2: Alternative Residuals
AR(10) -11.68∗∗ 5.41 787
MA(10) -8.68∗ 4.96 796
Panel 3: Taghri Birdi
Top 10% (lag) -13.03∗∗∗ 4.90 796
Top 10% (lag, min.) -1.00 5.21 794
Notes: estimates of equation (1) reported including decade dummies and the inter-
action term Faminet ∗ Shiat in all specifications (and are thus comparable to those
reported in column (1) of table three). The dependent variable is 100* a dummy vari-
able equal to one if the incumbent judge at the start of the Nile year t was dismissed
on the interval (t,t+1). The first panel varies the cutoff for Faminet using the top 5%
of Nile flood deviations in the first row and the top 10% of Nile floods calculated using
dynasty-specific cutoffs in the second. The second panel calculates residuals using an
autoregression with 10 lags and a moving average with 10 lags. The third panel uses
Taghri Birdi’s (uncorrected) data to calculate the variable Faminet using both the
maximum (first entry) and the minimum. Coefficients are reported with Newey-West
standard errors with 7 lags in parentheses with the exception of those in the second
row of panel 3 where robust standard errors are reported due to gaps in the data.
∗∗∗,∗∗and ∗indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
